Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study

This study reports on an experiment using variations of the ultimatum game. The experiment controls the amount and type of information known to the responder in the game. In two treatments, she knows both the absolute (money) and relative (fairness) payoffs from an offer. In the other two, she knows either only the absolute or only the relative payoffs. The predictions of four models for these treatments are tested: subgame-perfection, Bolton\u27s comparative equilibrium, Ochs and Roth\u27s absolute threshold, and Ochs and Roth\u27s percentage threshold hypothesis

Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms: An Experiment in Team Production

Alchian and Demsetz\u27s (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, reduces shirking (free riding). This paper experimentally tests this claim. Participants are informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about their team\u27s total contribution. Average contributions in the two treatments are the same. However, contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are discussed

AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONAL COOPERATION

Experimental and empirical evidence identifies the existence of socialpreferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. In this paper, wefurther examine one such social preference: conditional cooperation. We run threeexperimental public goods games, the traditional voluntary contribution mechanism(VCM, also called the linear public goods game), the weak-link mechanism (WLM) andthe best-shot mechanism (BSM). We then analyze the existence and types ofconditional cooperation observed. We find that participants are responsive to the pastcontributions of others in all three games, but are most responsive to differentcontributions in each game: the median in the VCM, the minimum in the WLM and themaximum in the BSM. We conclude by discussing implications of these differences forbehavior in these three mechanisms. This paper thus refines our notions of conditionalcooperation to allow for different types of public good production functions and byextension, other contexts.experimental economics, conditional cooperation, public goods

Rent-Seeking for a Risky Rent A Model and Experimental Investigation

Rent-seeking models have been used to predict and explain a wide variety of political decisions. This paper extends Tullock’s classic rent-seeking model to the case of a risky rent, where the winner of the rent-seeking contest does not receive the rent for sure, but only probabilistically. We derive the equilibrium and comparative static predictions from our extended model and present the results of an experiment with subjects from the US and Turkey to test it. Results are consistent with the comparative static predictions of the model, although we observe significantly more absolute levels of rent-seeking than the model predicts, consistent with previous experimental results. We conclude by discussing implications of our results for a variety of rent-seeking settings

Alternative Rebate Rules in the Provision of a Threshold Public Good: An Experimental Investigation

This study reports the effects of rebate rules on voluntary contributions to a threshold public good. Rebate rules specify how excess contributions, over the threshold amount are distributed. We examine three rebate rules experimentally: a no rebate policy where excess contributions are discarded, a proportional rebate policy where excess contributions are rebated proportionally to an individual\u27s contribution, and a utilization rebate policy where excess contributions provide some continuous public good. Significantly more Nash equilibrium outcomes are observed under the no rebate treatment than under either of the other two. Interestingly, the variance of contributions differs significantly between rebate treatments

Biases in Casino Betting: The Hot Hand and the Gambler’s Fallacy

We examine two departures of individual perceptions of randomness from probability theory: the hot hand and the gambler’s fallacy, and their respective opposites. This paper’s first contribution is to use data from the field (individuals playing roulette in a casino) to demonstrate the existence and impact of these biases that have been previously documented in the lab. Decisions in the field are consistent with biased beliefs, although we observe significant individual heterogeneity in the population. A second contribution is to separately identify these biases within a given individual, then to examine their within-person correlation. We find a positive and significant correlation across individuals between hot hand and gambler’s fallacy biases, suggesting a common (root) cause of the two related errors. We speculate as to the source of this correlation (locus of control), and suggest future research which could test this speculation

The Effect of Incomplete Information in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment

Fiscal stress and decreasing government budgets have led to renewed interest in voluntary contributions for the funding of public goods. This paper experimentally examines the Provision Point Mechanism (PPM), a voluntary contribution mechanism for the funding of lumpy public goods. Previous research has demonstrated the effectiveness of this mechanism at providing public goods, however all were conducted in an environment of complete information, which fails to capture the uncertainties of the real world. This study tests the efficacy of the PPM in informationally limited settings. We find no significant differences in the rate of successful provisions or level of group contributions when subjects have limited information about the valuations of others than when they have complete information